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Zahavi v. State, 131 Nev. Adv. Op. 7 (Feb. 26, 2015)1 
 
CRIMINAL LAW: NEVADA’S BAD CHECK STATUTE 
 
Summary 
 The Court determined that (1) a casino’s knowledge of insufficient funds may negate the 
intent-to-defraud element under NRS 205.130; (2) there is no basis for a separate jury 




 To obtain credit and receive markers at a casino, the casino requires their patron to 
complete a credit application, which includes providing bank information that the casino may use 
to check account balances. Then the casino obtains the patron’s credit report showing past player 
history, play at other casinos, and markers owed to other casinos. The casino then grants a line of 
credit to credit worthy patrons and the patron may obtain markers that can be exchanged for 
gaming chips. Each marker informs the patron that the marker is like a personal check and can be 
withdrawn from their account at any time. Each marker must then be signed by the patron before 
use. Generally, as a courtesy, casinos do not immediately deposit the markers until a designated 
disposition date or longer if the patron is working with the casino to pay a marker’s remaining 
balance.  
 Between October and December 2008, Zahavi received 14 casino markers, totaling 
$385,000, through existing and new lines of credit at four Las Vegas casinos. In October 2008, 
Zahavi executed nine markers at the Venetian Resort and Casino and the Palazzo Hotel and 
Casino, totaling $184,000. Zahavi signed each marker, representing that he understood the 
marker to be identical to a personal check and that it was payable upon demand. The evidence 
introduced during trial showed that the Venetian and Palazzo obtained Zavavi’s August 2008 
credit report and his bank account averages, amounting to $25,000 to $50,000 in one account and 
$50,000 to $75,000 in another. When Zahavi failed to timely pay the markers, they were 
presented for payment from his bank accounts and returned for insufficient funds.  
 Zahavi also executed two $50,000 markers at the Hard Rock Hotel and Casino in October 
2008. He made similar representations after signing these markers and Hard Rock had similar 
bank information. The casino did not learn of Zahavi’s actual bank account balances until two 
days after issuing him the markers. Again, when Zahavi failed to timely pay the markers, they 
were presented for payment from his bank accounts and returned for insufficient funds.  
 Zahavi obtained an additional three markers at Caesars Palace Hotel and Casino in 
December 2008. Again, Zahavi made similar representations when signing these markers. 
However, Caesars had Zahavi’s 2005 credit report on file and did not introduce evidence 
showing knowledge of the current state of his bank accounts. Again, after multiple collection 
efforts, the casino presented the markers for payment from his bank accounts and they were 
returned for insufficient funds. 
 All four casinos sent Zahavi a required ten-day demand letter requesting payment after 
receiving the returned markers, yet he failed to pay. The 14 unpaid markers were then sent to the 
Clark County District Attorney’s Office for criminal prosecution under Nevada’s bad-check 
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statute. The State filed an indictment, including one count for each casino—totaling four counts, 
against Zahavi for writing checks with insufficient bank funds with intent to defraud.  
 At trial, the district court gave the following jury instruction: “Whether a payee chooses 
to cash a check immediately or at a later date does not alter the character of the instrument. The 
mere fact that a marker is held for a period of time prior to deposit does not convert the 
instrument into a post dated contract.” Zahavi objected to this jury instruction and proposed other 




District court did not err in instructing jury that a casino’s choice to hold markers does not alter 
the marker into a short-term loan or post-dated check 
 
 The Court recognized that according to Nguyen v. State, a gaming marker was a “check 
or draft” under Nevada’s bad check statute2 and delayed payment of a marker does not render the 
instrument a loan document. The Court clarified the holding in Nguyen and reiterated that a 
casino marker bearing the phrase “payable upon demand” or similar language is not deemed a 
short term loan if both parties mutually understood and agreed to such terms. Therefore, the 
district court did not err regarding in its jury instruction. 
 
District court did not err in refusing to give Zahavi’s proposed jury instruction that a casino’s 
knowledge of insufficient funds negates the intent-to-defraud element or, alternatively, is an 
affirmative defense 
 
 The Court noted that the statute was silent on this issue and made no reference to 
negating the element of intent to defraud. The Court declined to allow negation of the intent 
element if the payee merely had “reason to believe” a patron had insufficient funds because 
casinos are under no obligation to research a patron’s financial status. However, the Court 
determined that the “intent to defraud” element may be negated by a showing that the casino had 
knowledge that the person obtaining the marker did not have sufficient funds to cover the marker 
at the time it was executed. The factors in determining whether intent may be negated include (1) 
what the payor represented and (2) what information was available to the payee. Because the 
Court determined that the “intent to defraud” element may be negated by a disclosure of 
insufficient funds to the payee, Zahavi was entitled to have the jury so instructed if there was 
proof in the record supporting the instruction and it was not adequately covered in other 
instructions.  
 Under the first factor, Zahavi did not affirmatively represent he had insufficient funds. He 
failed to affirmatively disclose to the casinos that he lacked sufficient funds in either of his 
accounts. In actuality, he guaranteed the casinos that there were sufficient funds available when 
he signed the marks and that the markers were payable upon demand and could be executed at 
any time.  
 Under the second factor, evidence indicated that at the time the casinos extended the line 
of credit, their records supported Zahavi’s affirmative representation that he had sufficient funds. 
Because Zahavi failed to make an affirmative disclosure to the casinos and the casinos had no 
present knowledge of his insufficiency of funds at the time the markers were executed, the Court 
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concluded that there was no evidence to negate the intent-to-defraud element, and therefore the 
district court did not abuse its discretion by refusing the instruction.  
 Additionally, the district court did not abuse its discretion in rejecting Zahavi’s proposed 
supplemental instruction on the intent to defraud because it was adequately addressed by the 
other instructions and he was permitted to argue his theory regarding the casino’s knowledge of 
is insufficient funds. 
 The Court further declined to hold that Zahavi was entitled to an instruction on an 
affirmative defense. None of the cases he cited characterize the payee’s knowledge of 
insufficient funds as establishing an affirmative defense. As such, the Court concluded the 
district court did not abuse its discretion in failing to instruct the jury on negating the intent-to-
fraud element or, alternatively, in refusing to instruct the jury that it was an affirmative defense.  
 
NRS 205.130 is constitutional 
 
 The statute is constitutional because it punishes a fraudulent act as summarized in the 
first element, not the mere accumulation of debt, and this court has previously determined that 
“intent to defraud” is constitutional.  
 The Nevada Constitution states that “there shall be no imprisonment for debt, except in 
cases of fraud.”3 This court has previously held that a criminal statute allowing a defendant to be 
arrested for removing or disposing of his property with the intent to defraud his creditors did not 
conflict with the provision in Nevada’s Constitution against imprisonment for debt, except in 
cases of fraud.  
 The Court noted that other states with similarly worded bad-check statutes have also 
reviewed the their statute’s constitutionality under their constitutions and have held that 
including only the intent-to-defraud element of fraud in a criminal statute did not violate a 
constitutional prohibition against imprisonment for debt. Based on the court’s prior decisions and 
persuasive authority from other jurisdictions with similar constitutional prohibitions, the Court 
concluded that Nevada’s bad check statute does not Nevada’s Constitution because Zahavi’s 
conviction is based on committing a fraudulent act and not on incurring a debt. Accordingly, the 
Court affirmed Zahavi’s judgment of conviction. 
 
Conclusion 
 A casino’s knowledge of insufficient funds may negate the intent-to fraud element under 
Nevada’s bad check statute and this statute is constitutional. However, a separate jury instruction 
or affirmative defense was not necessary. The district court here did not err, therefore the Court 
affirmed Zahavi’s four convictions of violating Nevada’s bad check statute.  
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